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## Home IBPS PO / English Language Test 83 Questions and Answers

1 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
Which of the following is false in the context of the passage?
American view on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir is still against our country
Israel has always longed for amity with India
India maintained a comf ortabl e relationship with USSR during the Cold War era.
US-Israel relationship has been there for long
None of these
2 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
It is often believed that India's forming close relations with Israe
may prove dangerous for any other front
may irk the Islamic nations
may prove detrimental for our neighours
None of these
3 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
What has kept away India and Israel from coming close to each other for long?
Israel has never taken seriously the terrorist strikes in India
Both the countries have dif ferent perception on terrorism
Israel is a Zionist state, whereas India is a secular nation
US-Israel closeness has always irked Indian.
None of these
4 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
Which of the following is most nearly the same in meaning as the word 'thrive' as used in the passage?
consist
grow
rely
survive
focus
5 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
Which of the following is most opposite in meaning of the word 'foreseeable'as used in the passage?
futuristic
past
imaginary
unpredictable
bygone
6 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
Which of the following is most nearly the same in meaning as the word 'residual'as used in the passage?
unusual
strange
virtual
discernible
remaining
7 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
Which of the following is most opposite in meaning to the word 'deliberately' as used in the passage?
unwittingly
predictably
illegally
softly
hestitatingly
8 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
Which of the following is most nearly the same in meaning as the word 'naivete' as used in the passage?
notion
theory
credulousness
judgement
formula
9 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
Which of the following is most nearly the same in meaning as the word 'preclude' as used in the passage?
deviate
blur
complex
prevent
blend
10 . Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words are given in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.

For much of the Cold War era, India enjoyed a strong military and strategic relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union. A relationship which stood the country in good steadon a number of occasions, most notably during the Bangladesh war of 1971. So, while it's true that no two countries in the world, the big ones even less so, share i denti cal i nterests, thi s necessary divergence, by itself, does not $preclude$ the possibility of a strategic alliance. Indeed, as the US-Israel relationship has repeatedly shown, a strategic tie-up can quite easily live with, even $thrive on$,occasional friction and strife. In other words, the question whether there can be a three-way strategic axis - involving India, Israel and the US - cannot be dismissed out of hand. At the very least, there does exist a strong basis for such a relationship to evolve and endure.
Call it jehad, fundamentalism or plain nzihilist violence, but India, Israel and the US are today the three leading targets of terror in the world and will remain so in the$foreseeable$ future. And, while New Delhi can legitimately complain about how terrorist strikes against it have been $deliberately$ downpl ayed i n Washington and Jerusalem, it's only a matter of ti me bef ore these $residual$ differences of perception - the legacy of a different historical epoch - are ironed out. Witness the remarkable turnaround, post-9/11, in the American stand on the so-called 'freedom struggle' being waged against India in Kashmir. As for Israel, it has al ways been keen on a close, long-term relationship with India. The reason that the two countries have stayed apart has to do with a misguided reluctance on the part of India's leadership to do business with the Zionist state: During Nehru's time, in the belief that international realpolitik can be conducted on the basis of simple moral precepts. And, after Nehru, in the perception that global geopolitics is a zerosum game: A close bond with Israel must necessarily come at the expense of the larger Muslim world. Clearly, the sooner we give up this romantic $naivete$, the better it will be hot just for India but for the larger democratic world, including Israel and the US?
What is the main concern of the author behind writing this passage?
The author wants the revival of ties between India and Russia
The author holds the Islamic world responsible for sponsoring terrorism
The author wants a worldwide front to address the issue of terrorism
The author advocates for an Indo-USIsrael relationship to jointly fight against terrorism
None of these